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This article focuses on the safeguards problem, that is, on the use of 'emergency'
protection which does not comply with GATT rules.1 For developing countries especially,
achieving multilateral discipline on safeguard actions is of great importance.2 Indeed,
the argument can be made that the lack of effective discipline on safeguards undermines
considerably the value of being a member of the GATT for these countries. The failure of
the safeguard talks during the Tokyo Round certainly devalued the results of that round of
negotiations. What is at stake for developing countries is, of course, access to developed
country markets. As the adherence to rules of nondiscrimination diminishes, uncertainty
regarding future market access increases, specialization according to comparative
advantage is made more difficult, and production and consumption decisions become
distorted.
In September 1986, the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) agreed to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, the
Uruguay Round. The agenda includes familiar topics such as trade in manufactured and
agricultural products, unfinished business from the previous round of negotiations (the
Tokyo Round) such as safeguards, and new topics such as services, intellectual property
rights, and trade-related investment. The Uruguay Round offers another chance to create
an effective agreement regarding imposition of emergency protection. However, it is likely
that developing countries, which have the most to gain from multilateral discipline on
safeguard actions, may not be able to obtain an agreement along the lines they would
prefer if tradeoffs are to be limited to the safeguards issue. A case will be made that
linking negotiations on different issues may be a productive strategy for all concerned. For
linkage to be feasible, the issue that is chosen has to be one on which developing countries
can offer "concessions." In practice it is probable that this will imply that developing
countries will have to liberalize access to their markets. This liberalization may pertain to
goods, services, or both. For a number of procedural reasons to be explained below,
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linkage between services and safeguards appears to offer the greatest potential for mutual
gains. The argument for linkage is quite general, however.
GATT Rules and the Incentives to Circumvent Them
As is well known, the major 'escape clause' of the GATT is Article XIX, which
allows the imposition of safeguard protection when imports are deemed to (threaten) harm
to the importing country's domestic competing industry. While allowing safeguard actions,
Article XIX specifies that certain necessary conditions have to be satisfied. Thus there are
rules relating to the establishment of 'cause' and 'injury' as a prerequisite for emergency
protection. Article XIX also gives affected exporting countries the right to retaliate
against the safeguard protection if compensation by the imposing country (the importer) is
not forthcoming or is deemed to be inadequate. Finally, it is generally accepted that any
safeguard action taken under GATT rules should be on a nondiscriminatory basis.
It is beyond the scope of this article to go at length into the the reasons why
safeguard protection is felt to be necessary by an imposing country. Fundamentally, it
reflects an unwillingness on the part of industrialized countries to adjust to a changing
world. The Australian economist W. Max Corden has hypothesized in this connection that
"policy reactions to market disturbances are frequently influenced or governed by implicit
values that could be summarized in a 'conservative social welfare function."'3 The
distinguishing characteristic of a conservative social welfare function is that real income
losses of any significant group in a society are to be avoided. Governments thus intervene
in response to market disturbances so as to protect existing real incomes.
In the last decade, safeguard actions have increasingly been taken through
procedures and mechanisms that circumvent the GATPT. 4 Voluntary export restraint
agreements (VERs) are a prominent example. One of the objectives of the Tokyo Round of
multilateral trade negotiations was to develop an agreement on safeguards which would
prevent safeguard imposing countries from circumventing the multilateral discipline and
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transparency rules of the GATT. While the Tokyo Round resulted in many agreements
(Codes) on various issue areas, a safeguards agreement proved impossible to negotiate,
implying that the status quo was preferred by at least one major party (or bloc) over any
proposed agreement.5 Thus, to understand the failure of the negotiations, it is necessary
to understand what the 'value' of the status quo is, as any safeguards agreement will have
to improve on it for all parties concerned. In large part this entails investigating what the
incentives are to circumvent the GATT rules regarding emergency protection, that is, to
use VERs.6
Three aspects of Article XIX may play a role in explaining the widespread use of
measures that circumvent the GATT. These are the remedy allowed (that is, the type of
protection that may be imposed); the affected party's right to retaliate (the "compensation
requirement"); and the need to satisfy preconditions such as "cause" and "injury." The
last aspect is obvious: use of VERs is not contingent on the satisfaction of prerequisites,
thus making them easier for importers to impose/negotiate. The remedy and retaliation
issues are related. The former does not concern the instrument of protection, as formally
the GATT allows either tariff or nontariff protection in a safeguards situation. Being
constrained to use tariff protection thus cannot be an issue.7 What is felt to be the
constraint by importers, of course, is the widely held perception that safeguard actions are
to be nondiscriminatory.8 This is what makes retaliation/compensation a constraint. A
preference for selective actions then can be explained by recognizing that they allow a
country to avoid the compensation/retaliation bill of a nondiscriminatory action, while at
the same time offering built-in compensation to affected exporters by allowing them to
garner the quota rents.
Although this justification for selectivity may seem intuitive, upon reflection it is not
very convincing. In large part this is the case because selective protection is rarely
effective. One VER almost invariably leads to a series of them as long as there exist
competitive sources of supply and protection is seriously sought. The ineffectiveness of
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selective protection has been demonstrated convincingly in the literature on this subject.9
In those cases where protection is seriously felt to be necessary, it will usually have to
become global. Textiles, television receivers, and steel are well known examples where
this occurred. Thus, selective actions at best allow a country to meet its "compensation
bill" gradually. From an economic perspective, however, selectivity (whether it eventually
leads to a global measure or not) usually will be more costly than a measure which is
taken in a nondiscriminatory fashion. This is because of the initial and consequent
distortions associated with selective actions which do not occur if the action is truly global
from the start.
Given the ineffectiveness and high cost of selective actions, the demonstrated
preference for selectivity on the part of importing nations primarily must have
noneconomic foundations. Possible arguments for being able to impose selective safeguard
actions include the following. One possibility is that governments are well aware of the
ineffectiveness of discriminatory measures and that is precisely why they are willing to
impose them. In this manner they keep both domestic and foreign affected firms relatively
happy. While the necessity of the parties involved to have differing information makes
this a rather unlikely explanation, there could be some relevance to this argument
depending on the relative power of the domestic industry. Another possibility, related in
some sense to the previous one, is that governments have a wish not to be perceived as
being (too) protectionist. It may well be that it is easier to defend a limited protectionist
action to other countries and/or domestic groups who oppose the protection, while at the
same time satisfying (albeit imperfectly) the relevant domestic industry. Finally, being
able to take selective measures allows one to exempt allies and "innocent" parties which
one does not want to subject to 'unfriendly' measures. For example, selective actions have
been justified by pointing out that global actions would affect beneficiaries of preferential
tariff schemes. More generally, the revealed preference for selectivity may be explained in
part by a growing desire to turn away from multilateralism and towards bilateralism. In
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the United States this trend towards bilateralism is reflected in the calls for a 'level
playing field', bilaterally balanced trade, and 'reciprocity'.
Towards a Safeguards Agreement
Ideally, developing countries (and many developed economies for that matter) prefer
that any safeguard agreement include as major elements nondiscrimination, a
compensation requirement, and preconditions for action. Indeed, the elements of an
"optimal" agreement for these nations is likely to resemble Article XIX closely. The
American economist Alan Deardorff has proposed elements of a safeguards agreement
which may be considered as being representative of the the type of agreement many
developing nations might prefer.10 He proposes that the remedy in a safeguard action be
a temporary global quota, set at a level no less than some base year level of imports (prior
to injury). Quotas are to be allocated to all exporting countries, thus to a greater or lesser
extent ensuring both nondiscrimination and compensation. Furthermore, quotas are to be
transferable between countries, that is, they are to be globally marketable. This ensures
that trade and specialization will follow comparative advantage as there will be only one
quota premium (equivalent to some MFN tariff). In economic terms, a safeguards
agreement along these lines would be superior to the status quo (VERs) for all parties.
Developing countries as a group would gain because, in addition to the procedural
requirements of an agreement relating to issues such as preconditions, transparency and
the duration of safeguard actions, nondiscriminatory safeguard actions and tradable quotas
imply a substantial reduction in uncertainty regarding future market access, while still
ensuring some degree of compensation. Developed nations also would gain because
safeguard protection would be effective and less costly than global systems of bilateral
VERs. In general, safeguard actions taken in this fashion would avoid both the distortions
due to the initial imposition of the VER (such as transhipment, false certificates of origin,
incentives to relocate productive facilities) and the distortions due to the gradual
cartelization of the world market, which locks in a certain pattern of production and trade.
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It should be noted that Deardorff's proposal improves on those made during the
Tokyo Round.1 1 Proposals for a safeguards code made during (and after) the Tokyo
Round incorporated either selectivity of some kind or rejected it completely. However,
those that rejected selectivity did not offer anything substantial to those in favor of it to
induce them to drop their demand. Conversely, those arguing for selectivity often offered
'packages' that were worse than the status quo for exporters. This is true especially of
proposals incorporating some kind of 'consensual' selectivity, where the compensation
requirement would be waived for those countries imposing a safeguard action conforming
to the procedural requirements of the code. Such proposals contain few incentives for
exporters. Those most likely to be subjected to safeguard protection would lose their
compensation, while those likely to be excluded from an action would neither gain nor lose.
The major benefit of such a code is the discipline it presumably would impose regarding the
imposition of an action. This quite likely was (and is) not a sufficient inducement for
exporters.
These kinds of problems also exist with respect to achieving acceptance in the
Uruguay Round of an agreement along the lines just discussed. What are the incentives
for importers to sign and abide by such an agreement, given the preference they continue
to reveal for selectivity (VERs)? One cannot rely on the hope that importing nations have
come to realize that nondiscrimination is in their best interest. However, it is noteworthy
in this connection that there are some signs that the preference for selectivity on the part
of an important importing bloc such as the European Community may have weakened.
Indeed, it is possible that the Community will accept a nondiscriminatory agreement at the
end of the Uruguay Round.1  But, even if this were to prove the case, it is not likely that
the European Community will drop its insistence on selectivity without demanding
something in return. Also, it is not unlikely that the United States will push for some kind
of a selective agreement.13 Even if all nations were to agree on nondiscrimination,
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another problem is that some industrialized nations may push for an agreement without a
compensation requirement.
It is by no means certain that developing countries will be able to achieve a
safeguards agreement along the lines they prefer during the current round. This holds
especially if negotiations remain limited to bargaining on the safeguards issue only,
because concessions only can be made with respect to selectivity or compensation. But,
weakening on either of these elements could easily lead to an outcome worse than the
status quo for many developing nations.14 I believe a case can be made on behalf of
developing countries for attempting to add issues, that is, for linking negotiations on
different areas. In general, issue addition or linkage may create a zone of feasible
agreement where there was none previously, or expand the number of feasible
agreements. In either case all parties are made better off. Thus, a safeguards agreement
of the type preferred by developing nations may become possible if the safeguards
discussions are combined (linked) with another issue, such that what is "lost" by a party
on one issue is compensated by "gains" on the other issue. It is important to note that
linkage not only may make such an agreement feasible, it can also help ensure that
nations abide by it. This is because the cost of reneging increase by definition for all
parties as all parties now have more to lose if the agreement breaks down.
The problem then is to identify possible issues which may be linked to the
safeguard talks. Feasible issues will have to meet a number of criteria. Thus, the major
parties involved in both discussions should be the same and should perceive their interests
to be opposed on both issues. Furthermore, the issues should offer sufficient scope for
tradeoffs. One issue that meets these criteria is is access to the markets of developing
countries. That is, liberalization of trade regimes in developing countries could be linked to
the safeguards discussions. The same players are involved in these issues, their perceived
interests diverge on both issues, and there cerainly appears to be sufficient scope for
tradeoffs to be made. Note that other potential issues such as subsidies or agricultural
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trade do not meet the necessary conditions. There the underlying conflicts are mainly
between industrialized nations.
Liberalization usually is meant to refer to trade in goods. However, services and
trade-related investment have for the first time been put on the agenda of a GATT round,
so that the focus can be on trade or investment in goods, services, or both. There are,
however, a number of practical difficulties with attempting to link safeguards and
developing country liberalization of trade in goods.15 First, this would run into legal
difficulties because developing countries formally have been accorded "special and
differential" treatment in Part IV of the GATT. Although this may not have had much
effect in practice, it has been codefied into the GATT, and will be very difficult to alter.
This problem does not arise with services or trade-related investment as these are for the
most part not covered by the GATT. A second, related argument is that the agenda for
the Uruguay Round has already been set. While it does include topics such as services and
trade-related investment, it does not include developing country trade regimes.16 As it
proved to be very difficult to get the Contracting Parties to the GATT to agree on the
agenda for the Uruguay round, there is good reason to accept the agenda as a given.
Third, there exist a multitude of preferential schemes affecting trade in goods which could
make discussions quite complicated. This is not the case for services or investment, which
essentially "have no history" in the GATT.
Of the issues on the agenda, services appear to offer the greatest scope for fruitful
linkage with safeguards. Thus, for example, it is important to note that there exist strong
lobbies in the developed nations (especially the United States) that want to see progress
made on services.1 Conversely, domestic service lobbies in developing countries on
average may be weaker than those associated with import-competing goods industries,
given that the latter have a vested interest in maintaining existing protection and thus
may be better organized. Thus, there may exist greater scope for an agreement on
services than for liberalization of trade and investment in goods in developing countries.
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Furthermore, and related to the previous argument, it may be the case that the gains from
liberalizing service sectors are greater than for goods sectors. This is because access to
service sectors is often blocked completely, in contrast to goods. In conjunction with the
fact that trade in services predominantly concerns trade in intermediate inputs, domestic
forces favouring liberalization in services may be relatively strong.
Perhaps the most important argument for focusing on liberalization of services is
that an implicit linkage between services and the other Uruguay round issues already
exists. Thus, for example, it appears very likely that if the United States feels that
negotiations on services have not been fruitful, it will reconsider agreements reached on
other issues. 1 In practice this is likely to imply unilateral withdrawal of
U.S. "concessions" made on trade in goods, which could be highly detrimental to developing
country interests. A productive strategy on the part of the developing countries is then to
recognize this implicit linkage at the outset and attempt to influence the choice of issues to
be linked. The remainder of this article will discuss briefly some of the arguments that
could, in principle, be put forward by developing countries against participating in the
creation of a "General Agreement on Trade in Services." I will argue that such an
agreement can benefit developing countries as much as industrialized countries. Thus, a
services-safeguards link may enable them to get something for (almost) nothing. However,
even if this were not the case, inclusion of services may prove worthwile if it leads to
effective multilateral discipline on safeguards.
Costs and Benefits of Multilateral Rules for Services
The push to create multilateral discipline on trade in services by the major
industrialized nations, particularly the United States, has not met with great enthusiasm
on the part of developing countries. As the Canadian scholar Rodney Grey has noted, the
services proposal "...must have very little appeal to developing countries... As they will
see it, the fully industrialized and services economies of the North are trying to rework the
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GATT bargain, so as to either secure new scope for restricting imports of goods, or for
securing new rights for markets in the South."19 Perceptions of this kind led to services
being put on a separate track in the Uruguay Round. That is, the negotiations on this
topic do not formally function under the aegis of the GATT, although GATT procedures
and practices are followed.20 Services are nevertheless an integral part of the Uruguay
Round, given that the 'Services Group' reports to the Trade Negotiations Committee and
has access to the GATT Secretariat for administrative and analytical support.
It should be emphasized first that services is neither a North-South issue in the
sense of the North standing to gain at the expense of the South, nor a zero-sum game.
Who gains and who loses will be determined on a very disaggregated level. Many
developing countries are net exporters of services, and although their comparative
advantage often lies in labor intensive services, many services are, in fact, labor intensive.
The main issue then is to make sure these services are included in the agenda.
An important and frequently used economic argument against liberalization of trade
and investment in services is the infant industry argument. From the point of view of
services the issue is to what extent, if any, the fact that services differ from goods alters
the rather stringent conditions that have to be met for infant industry protection to be
optimal (or even beneficial). In general, for infant industry protection to be justified on
economic grounds the protected industry must be subject to a short run cost disadvantage,
possibly due to (in conjunction with) the existence of noncapturable externalities. The
protection must have the effect of neutralizing the externality and must only be necessary
for the start-up period of the industry. Sources of the externality may be
nonappropriability of the necessary technology or know-how, which may include the costs
of training workers, or various market imperfections (in information or capital markets).
There does not seem to be anything inherent in the general characteristics of most service
industries that diminishes the relevance of the existing literature on infant industry
protection. Thus, the general presumption exists that this protection will often be
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inefficient.21 Indeed, there may be even less of a rationale for infant industry protection
of many service industries than there is for goods industries. This holds especially for
what has been called demander-located services, that is, services which require the
provider of a service to move to the location of the demander.2 2 There is some evidence
that often the best way to develop an efficient indigenous (demander-located) service
industry is to encourage foreign direct investment. This is true especially for those
services where technologies can only be aquired 'by doing'.2 3 'Turn key' investment
projects in these cases usually are impossible, given that the kinds of services involved are
not tradable at arms length. Traditional infant industry protection may then have very
little beneficial effect.
Another argument against liberalization is related to the question of comparative
advantage. It may be feared that liberalization will lead to balance of payments problems.
The implicit assumptions are that most tradable services are relatively capital-intensive
and that developing countries are relatively well endowed with (unskilled) labor. After
liberalization, due to relatively costly home production of the capital intensive services, net
imports of services are expected to increase, worsening the current account and making
foreign exchange constraints more binding. While this may be perceived as a problem, it is
not justifiable from an economic point of view. Although there may be adjustment costs,
there is a presumption that domestic welfare will increase in the same way as for the
liberalization of goods. In fact, welfare gains may be greater with respect to services
because in general a large proportion of services are intermediate inputs. As costs of
intermediates are reduced, production (and exports) should increase. Also, to the extent
that service outputs are nontradable, allowing service-related foreign direct investment to
occur usually will entail increased employment of domestic factors of production. In any
event, to the extent that balance-of-payments problems occur as a result of liberalization,
it could be agreed upon that IMFIWorld Bank lending would be made available.
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The service sector often is more heavily regulated than other sectors of the economy.
While the arguments against liberalization discussed above were economic in nature, more
often than not arguments against reducing the scope for discretionary government
behaviour are non-economic. In general, the often extensive regulation of the service
sector is based on safeguarding the "national interest." How this is defined is, of course, a
sovereign matter. As argued by the Australian economist Gary Sampson, however, it
should be realized that protection, no matter what the justification, has economy wide
implications.24 In general, for good decision making to occur, it is necessary that
information on these implications is supplied and taken into consideration in the decision
making process. At present this is not done enough, in either developing or developed
countries.2 5
While much empirical work remains to be done, in my view the arguments against
creating a multilateral agreement on trade in services are not compelling. Developing
countries potentially stand to gain through technology transfer, lower cost of inputs and
final services, increased net exports of those services in which they have comparative
advantage, and finally, being able to consume a greater variety of services. To be sure,
existing inefficient firms will suffer and adjustment costs may be high for some sectors in
some countries. The issue is the extent to which benefits outweigh costs. The argument
made here is that the benefit/cost ratio often may be positive. In general, this has been
the experience of the developed countries. In any case, net benefits presumably will be
greater if 'concessions' on services help to achieve agreement on safeguards. Arguably, for
many developing nations safeguards, not services, is the more important issue.
Concluding Comrnents
The premise of this paper is that the Uruguay Round offers a unique opportunity to
deal with the problem of safeguard protection but that the negotiations may have to be
broadened to include seemingly unrelated issues. It should be emphasized that linkage
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may not prove to be necessary. Thus, if it has become sufficiently clear since the Tokyo
Round that the economic incentives for importing nations to pursue selective safeguard
protection are minimal, and this leads to sufficient pressure (domestic and international) on
governments to abstain from them, it may be that proposals which would benefit all
parties in economic terms have become feasible. However, given that the political
preference that is displayed for selectivity and discretion in commercial policy shows few
signs of abating, developing countries may have to show a willingness to 'buy' the type of
safeguards agreement they prefer. I have argued that one way in which they may be able
to do this is by participating in the negotiations on services and linking the two issues. As
noted above, it is likely that services will be linked to the rest of the negotiations in any
case. Thus, an implicit linkage already exists. The question then arises whether linkage
should be formalized explicitly. I do not believe that this is required. All that is necessary
is that parties are aware that at some point linkages (comparisons) will be required and
agree on the issues to linked. At what point in the negotiations linkage should occur is
best left to the negotiators.
It should be noted that there is likely to be a general need for linkages in the
Uruguay Round if it is to be a success. In large part this is because the United States,
with its huge and persistent trade deficit, will not be willing to offer concessions that are
not matched by other nations. Although present current account disequilibria have macro-
economic causes and need macro-economic remedies, they have implications for the GATT
negotiations. Arguably, the main task of the negotiators is to prevent a further closing of
industrialized markets (standstill and rollback). A necessary condition for this to be
achieved will be that the more advanced developing countries liberalize access to their own
markets. In closing, I can do no better than quote Paul Voicker's address to the GATT on
the occasion of its fortieth aniversary. "Obviously, instead of growing trade frictions there
should be the makings in this area [market access] of a constructive international bargain
- liberalization of trading practices by the middle-income developing countries (and the
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newly industrialized countries) while the industrialized world provides greater assurance
that its markets will remain open."2 6 This article has proposed possible elements of one
such bargain. Many others also are possible and may prove to be more feasible. The
point to be made is that negotiators will have to creative in their attempts to achieve the
required constructive international bargains.
15
Footnotes
lI would like to thank Robert M. Stern and Alan V. Deardorff, whose comments on
previous drafts of this paper substantially improved the present version. Financial
assistance was provided by the Ford Foundation in support of a program of research in
trade policy at The University of Michigan.
2As used here, the term developing countries should be understood to include the newly
industrializing countries. Although in practice it is the latter group that is most affected
by safeguards protection, the issue is important for all developing countries. In terms of
the Uruguay Round of negotiations, however, it is clear that the more advanced developing
countries will have to take a leadership role.
3W. Max Corden, "Policies Toward Market Disturbance." In Richard Snape (ed.), Issues
in World Trade Policy: GATT at the Crossroads. London: MacMillan, pp. 121-40, 1986.
The concept of a conservative social welfare function was first described explicitly in
Corden's Trade Policy and Economic Welfare, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974. Patrick
Messerlin has made use of the concept in "The Political Economy of Protection: The
Bureaucratic Case," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 117, pp. 469-96, 1981, as has Alan
Deardorff in "Safeguards Policy and the Conservative Social Welfare Function," in Henryk
Kierzkowski (ed.), Protection and Competition in International Trade. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1987.
4 See Gary Sampson, 'Safeguarding Producers fron Serious Injury' in J. M. Finger and
A. Olechowski (eds.), The Uruguay Round: A Handbook for Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1987.
5For a general discussion of the negotiations, see Leslie A. Glick, Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: World Trade After the Tokyo Round. Totowa: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984
or Gilbert Winham, International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986. Excellent contemporary discussions that focus in part
on the safeguards issue are Hugh Corbet, "On the Importance of Being Earnest about
Further GATT Negotiations," The World Economy, vol. 2, 1979, pp. 319-42, and Victoria
Curzon-Price, "Surplus Capacity and what the Tokyo Round Failed to Settle," The World
Economy, vol. 2, 1979, pp. 305-19. An evaluation of the operation of the Tokyo Round
Codes can be found in Robert M. Stern, John H. Jackson, and Bernard M. Hoekman, An
Assessment of the GATT Codes on Non-tariff Measures. Thames Essay No. 55. Aldershot:
Gower, for the Trade Policy Research Centre, 1988.
6The following is based on a much more extensive analysis in Hoekman, "The Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Investigating the Scope for Agreement,"
manuscript, The University of Michigan, 1988.
7See John H. Jackson, "The Role of GATT in Monitoring and Promoting Adjustment: The
Safeguards System." Research Seminar in International Economics Discussion Paper
No. 170, The University of Michigan, 1986.
8The legal arguments for nondiscriminatory safeguard actions, while quite strong, are not
completely unambiguous. See Jackson, op cit. for a discussion of this matter.
9See, for example, Robert Baldwin, "The Inefficacy of Trade Policy," Essays in
International Finance, No. 150. Princeton University, 1982; Robert Baldwin and Richard
Green, "The Effects of Protection on Domestic Output." University of Wisconsin-Madison,
mimeo, 1987; Gary Hufbauer, Diane Berliner, and Kimberly Elliot, Trade Protection in the
16
United States: 31 Cases. Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1986;
Helen Hughes and Anne Krueger, "Effects of Protection in Developed Countries on
Developing Countries Exports of Manufactures," in Robert Baldwin and Anne Krueger
(eds.), The Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1984. and David Yoffie, Power and Protectionism, Strategies of the Newly
Industrializing Countries. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
10Deardorff, op cit.. A proposal of this type is consistent with the one made recently by a
group of Pacific nations in the Uruguay Round (see "Elements of a Proposal on
Safeguards," Communication from Australia, Hong Kong, Korea, New Zealand, and
Singapore. Geneva: GATT, May 25, 1987).
11A detailed analysis of the failure of the Tokyo Round safeguards negotiations is beyond
the scope of this paper. The following is based on Hoekman, op cit..
12This statement is based on discussions with European Community trade officials. See
also The Economist, July 18, 1987, p. 71.
13According to some American trade officials this cannot be ruled out, given the present
mood of the U.S. Congress.
14Space constraints make a detailed discussion of the issues raised here impossible.
Interested readers are referred to Hoekman, op cit, available on request from the author.
15The following arguments should not be taken to imply that there is not a strong case to
be made for (unilateral) liberalization of trade regimes by developing countries. An
argument along these lines in the context of trade negotiations has been made by Martin
Wolf, "Two-Edged Sword: Demands of Developing Countries and the Trading System." In
Jagdish Bhagwati and John Gerard Ruggie (eds.), Power, Passions, and Purpose: Prospects
for North-South Negotiations. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984, pp. 201-30.
16The agenda covers 15 topics: tariffs, non-tariff measures; tropical products; natural
resource based products; textiles and clothing; agriculture; articles of the GATT;
safeguards; meetings and arrangements; subsidies and countervailing measures; dispute
settlement; trade-related aspects of intellectual property (including counterfeit); trade-
related investment in goods; functioning of the GATT system; and finally, services (Bureau
of National Affairs, International Trade Reporter, February 4, 1987, p. 124).
17In itself, as noted by Wolf (op cit., p. 222), "the intensity of American interest can prove
tactically useful since developing countries should be able to obtain something in return for
a willingness to discuss the issue."
18See, for example, Jeffrey Ryser and John Templeman, "In Uruguay, General
Disagreement on Tariffs and Trade," Business Week, October 6, 1986, p. 31.
1Rodney Grey, "Negotiating About Trade and Investment in Services." In Robert
M. Stern (ed.), Trade and Investrnent in Services: Canada/U.S. Perspectives. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1985.
2This reflects a compromise reached between those GATT rnembers that supported
bringing services into the negotiations and those countries (led by Brazil and India) which
opposed any discussion of extending the GATT to new issue areas.
17
21The degree of inefficiency is, of course, a function of the protective instrument. Thus, for
example, tariffs or quotas usually will be less efficient than subsidies as they are more
distortionary.
22Robert M. Stern and Bernard M. Hoekman, "Issues and Data Needs for GATT
Negotiations on Services," The World Economy, vol. 10, 1987, pp. 39-60. Examples of
demander-located services include many professional services, especially those where face-
to-face contact in important.
23See Ronald Shelp, J. C. Stephenson, N. S. Truitt, and B. Wasow, Service Industries and
Economic Development: Case Studies in Technology Transfer. New York: Praeger, 1984.
2 4"Developing Countries and the Liberalization of Trade in Services," manuscript, 1987.
2 5As discussed, for example, in Stern and Hoekman, op cit., data problems severely
hamper research on the service sector. The issue, however, is that the kind of information
required often is not even sought. The problem then is as much one of demand as of
supply. The general argument, of course, applies as much to goods sectors as to services.
See in this connection Samuel Laird and Sampson, "The Case for Evaluating Protection in
an Economy-wide Perspective," The World Economy, vol. 10, pp. 177-92.
2 6"GATT Under Stress - Is there life after 40?" Geneva, November 30, 1987, p. 12.
_______ DATE DUE ____
DEMCO 38-297
